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US military in denial over € ’±pain ray€ ’²
December 14, 2007
US military vehicle equipped with the Active Denial System (Photo: US
Department of Defense)
Guardian | Dec 13, 2007
Concern over the safety of a crowd control system in tests sparks fears
about its use in operational situations
by David Hambling
Crowd control always presents a problem for the military and police.
How do you keep people away from a site without direct physical
confrontation, when someone is almost sure to get hurt? Tear gas has variable
effects and depends on wind; rubber bullets have killed. But what about a
system that inflicts pain at a distance, without contact?
That€ ’²s the idea behind the Active Denial System now being tested by
the US military. It is designed to cause excruciating pain without
injury by projecting a beam of energy about two metres across. Victims
describe the sensation as like a giant hairdryer on maximum heat, and no
human can withstand it for more than a few seconds. It€ ’²s certainly
effective, but the report of how a test subject received second-degree
burns raises doubts over how harmless it is.
The system, informally known as the € ’³pain ray€ ’´, works by
producing a beam of short-wavelength microwaves that only penetrate about
0.4mm into the skin, rapidly heating the epidermis. Tests have shown that
the beam will not cause cancer, infertility or damaged eyeballs.
Heating skin to 55C causes intolerable pain, but no injury - any higher could
be hazardous.
The US Air Force says over-exposure shouldn€ ’²t occur: € ’³While the
intensity of the beam varies with range, the safety margin and effects
calculations have taken the maximum beam intensity into account. The
repel effect will be virtually identical at short or long ranges until
the effects dissipate beyond the system€ ’²s effective range.€ ’´ Dr
Juergen Altmann, physicist with the Bochum Verification project,
isn€ ’²t convinced. His calculations suggest a dangerously narrow safety
margin.
Safety concerns
In April, the system underwent field testing to determine its
effectiveness in different situations. A report on a testing accident was
obtained recently by Wired journalist Sharon Weinberger using the Freedom of
Information Act. In one scenario the beam was to be used to prevent
€ ’³Red Force€ ’´ players from setting up an improvised explosive device
€ ’³at a very far distance€ ’´. (The maximum range is classified,
but thought to be about 750 metres.)
Earlier that day it had been used successfully at 75% power level and
three-second duration. According to the report: € ’³ADS Operator P4 set
power to 100% for four-second duration, so as to be effective at the
longer range.€ ’´ A problem prevented the test from taking place - the
system€ ’²s magnet requires supercooling and can be temperamental in
hot weather. The commander decided to move on to the next scenario,
which would test the beam by driving away Red Forces attempting to carry
out surveillance at much closer range.
Unfortunately, the crew forgot to change the settings. When the system
was fired, € ’³Red Forces Role Player P3 immediately knew that he had
received a stronger than usual shot from the ADS; he gave the quit
signal and left the field.€ ’´ The quit signal, raising one hand, has been
used throughout Active Denial trials to indicate that a subject wishes
to end testing.
The description of the injuries has been censored from the report: all
we can see is that they are covered by 11 numbered points. An Air Force
statement says: € ’³the injury was classified as a second degree
burn,€ ’´ a type characterised by blistering. Local newspapers reported
that the airman suffered burns on both legs and spent two days in the
Joseph M Still Burn Centre in Augusta, Georgia. The official report puts
the injury cost at $17,748.
Clearly the safeguards do not prevent operator error. € ’³This
document confirms my analysis that the intensity and dose to the target
subjects is left to the discretion of the operator,€ ’´ says Dr Altmann.
€ ’³Not only can he or she re-trigger on the same person without giving
appropriate cooling time, but also the strength of the beam and duration
can be changed during action. Both lead to the possibility of second-
and third-degree burn injury, which becomes life-threatening if more
than 20% to 50% of body surface is affected.€ ’´
Classified information
Steve Wright of Leeds Metropolitan University expresses similar
concerns. € ’³If this means that these parameters do not have automatic
safety overrides in place, there is the option of using this weapon to
facilitate maiming injuries or punitive incapacitation - and this was at
four seconds. We do not know what injuries would emerge for longer than
this because US authorities have seen fit to heavily censor the
biomedical information from the public record.€ ’´
If the system were used in Iraq, Wright believes safety considerations
might be overlooked. € ’³In the fear-filled conditions of a live and
hostile confrontation, the natural temptation would be to turn the
weapon up to full power to be certain that people taken down by it stayed
down.€ ’´
Altmann agrees that foreign use could be more dangerous. € ’³In tests
with their own personnel the US military are certainly relatively
cautious,€ ’´ he says. € ’³It is not difficult to imagine, on the other
hand, what can happen in an occupied country.€ ’´
Moreover, reports from previous tests show that reflections of the beam
can cause hotspots more than twice as strong as the main beam.
Software designed to check mobile phone signal strength has been used to
predict where these might appear, but it is not part of the system.
Proponents argue that it is better to risk causing a few minor burns
than to use live ammunition, often the only alternative. Opponents are
worried that if Active Denial is deployed, it could be the start of a new
form of high-tech oppression. € ’³One day the manufacturer will sell
it, perhaps to security forces of allies with less sensitive
tendencies,€ ’´ says Wright. € ’³Can one imagine this weapon being turned on
democratic forces in Pakistan, for example, and the authorities using
restraint?€ ’´
aftermathnews.wordpress.com/2007...-ray/
~~~
December 14, 2007
US military vehicle equipped with the Active Denial System (Photo: US
Department of Defense)
Guardian | Dec 13, 2007
Concern over the safety of a crowd control system in tests sparks fears
about its use in operational situations
by David Hambling
Crowd control always presents a problem for the military and police.
How do you keep people away from a site without direct physical
confrontation, when someone is almost sure to get hurt? Tear gas has variable
effects and depends on wind; rubber bullets have killed. But what about a
system that inflicts pain at a distance, without contact?
That€ ’²s the idea behind the Active Denial System now being tested by
the US military. It is designed to cause excruciating pain without
injury by projecting a beam of energy about two metres across. Victims
describe the sensation as like a giant hairdryer on maximum heat, and no
human can withstand it for more than a few seconds. It€ ’²s certainly
effective, but the report of how a test subject received second-degree
burns raises doubts over how harmless it is.
The system, informally known as the € ’³pain ray€ ’´, works by
producing a beam of short-wavelength microwaves that only penetrate about
0.4mm into the skin, rapidly heating the epidermis. Tests have shown that
the beam will not cause cancer, infertility or damaged eyeballs.
Heating skin to 55C causes intolerable pain, but no injury - any higher could
be hazardous.
The US Air Force says over-exposure shouldn€ ’²t occur: € ’³While the
intensity of the beam varies with range, the safety margin and effects
calculations have taken the maximum beam intensity into account. The
repel effect will be virtually identical at short or long ranges until
the effects dissipate beyond the system€ ’²s effective range.€ ’´ Dr
Juergen Altmann, physicist with the Bochum Verification project,
isn€ ’²t convinced. His calculations suggest a dangerously narrow safety
margin.
Safety concerns
In April, the system underwent field testing to determine its
effectiveness in different situations. A report on a testing accident was
obtained recently by Wired journalist Sharon Weinberger using the Freedom of
Information Act. In one scenario the beam was to be used to prevent
€ ’³Red Force€ ’´ players from setting up an improvised explosive device
€ ’³at a very far distance€ ’´. (The maximum range is classified,
but thought to be about 750 metres.)
Earlier that day it had been used successfully at 75% power level and
three-second duration. According to the report: € ’³ADS Operator P4 set
power to 100% for four-second duration, so as to be effective at the
longer range.€ ’´ A problem prevented the test from taking place - the
system€ ’²s magnet requires supercooling and can be temperamental in
hot weather. The commander decided to move on to the next scenario,
which would test the beam by driving away Red Forces attempting to carry
out surveillance at much closer range.
Unfortunately, the crew forgot to change the settings. When the system
was fired, € ’³Red Forces Role Player P3 immediately knew that he had
received a stronger than usual shot from the ADS; he gave the quit
signal and left the field.€ ’´ The quit signal, raising one hand, has been
used throughout Active Denial trials to indicate that a subject wishes
to end testing.
The description of the injuries has been censored from the report: all
we can see is that they are covered by 11 numbered points. An Air Force
statement says: € ’³the injury was classified as a second degree
burn,€ ’´ a type characterised by blistering. Local newspapers reported
that the airman suffered burns on both legs and spent two days in the
Joseph M Still Burn Centre in Augusta, Georgia. The official report puts
the injury cost at $17,748.
Clearly the safeguards do not prevent operator error. € ’³This
document confirms my analysis that the intensity and dose to the target
subjects is left to the discretion of the operator,€ ’´ says Dr Altmann.
€ ’³Not only can he or she re-trigger on the same person without giving
appropriate cooling time, but also the strength of the beam and duration
can be changed during action. Both lead to the possibility of second-
and third-degree burn injury, which becomes life-threatening if more
than 20% to 50% of body surface is affected.€ ’´
Classified information
Steve Wright of Leeds Metropolitan University expresses similar
concerns. € ’³If this means that these parameters do not have automatic
safety overrides in place, there is the option of using this weapon to
facilitate maiming injuries or punitive incapacitation - and this was at
four seconds. We do not know what injuries would emerge for longer than
this because US authorities have seen fit to heavily censor the
biomedical information from the public record.€ ’´
If the system were used in Iraq, Wright believes safety considerations
might be overlooked. € ’³In the fear-filled conditions of a live and
hostile confrontation, the natural temptation would be to turn the
weapon up to full power to be certain that people taken down by it stayed
down.€ ’´
Altmann agrees that foreign use could be more dangerous. € ’³In tests
with their own personnel the US military are certainly relatively
cautious,€ ’´ he says. € ’³It is not difficult to imagine, on the other
hand, what can happen in an occupied country.€ ’´
Moreover, reports from previous tests show that reflections of the beam
can cause hotspots more than twice as strong as the main beam.
Software designed to check mobile phone signal strength has been used to
predict where these might appear, but it is not part of the system.
Proponents argue that it is better to risk causing a few minor burns
than to use live ammunition, often the only alternative. Opponents are
worried that if Active Denial is deployed, it could be the start of a new
form of high-tech oppression. € ’³One day the manufacturer will sell
it, perhaps to security forces of allies with less sensitive
tendencies,€ ’´ says Wright. € ’³Can one imagine this weapon being turned on
democratic forces in Pakistan, for example, and the authorities using
restraint?€ ’´
aftermathnews.wordpress.com/2007...-ray/
~~~
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